Industrial Project: course site proposal

Who sees what

The rule that cannot be broken: students never read mentor feedback, scores or the agreed requirements. It must hold even against a logged-in student calling the tool's API directly, not only in the screens.

Roles

RoleCan do
CustomerSubmit and revise their own proposal, reply to review comments, see their team's reports and milestones, sign off reports, give feedback
StudentSee all project briefs, rank preferences, submit their team's weekly reports, milestones and requirements, submit peer assessments
MentorSee teams' work and every team's briefing, fill in weekly check-ins, score every team at presentations, approve the feedback sent to their own team
CoordinatorEverything, including setup
Course managerRead everything; decide grades
AI service accountRead what a playbook needs; write only AI outputs and proposal comments; cannot write scores or grades

Students and customers use simple portal pages; they cannot open the staff screens at all.

Records

RecordWritten byRead byHidden from students
Project proposal, with comment threadCustomer; staff and AI commentThat customer, staffYes
Project briefStaffEveryoneNo
Sealed specificationStaff with the customerThat customer, staffYes
Project preference and avoid listEach studentThat student, coordinatorFrom other students
Team, weekly report, sign-offs, milestones, requirements, dependency logTeam (sign-offs: mentor and customer)Team, staff, its customerNo
Mentor check-inMentorThat mentor, coordinator, course managerYes
Presentation scoreEach mentorThat mentor only, coordinator, course managerYes
Peer assessmentEach studentThat student, the team's mentor, coordinatorFrom other students
Customer feedbackCustomerStaffYes
AI output (digest, briefing, coverage report, decision sheet)AI service accountStaffYes
Merged feedback, grade recordsAI draft, mentor approves; mentor recommends, course manager decidesThe team's mentor, coordinator, course managerYes

Confidential data always has its own record type that students cannot open at all. Hiding a single field inside a record a student can read was found to be unreliable in the trials, so the design never relies on it.

How it is tested

A scripted confidentiality test runs at every one of the 14 checkpoints, logged in as every person in the cohort. Its expectations are written from the table above, independently of the tool's permission settings, so a wrong setting shows up as a difference.

PartWhat it checks
Settings auditEvery permission row matches the design flag by flag (a new row in Frappe allows writing by default; the audit catches that), no student or customer role on confidential record types, strict restrictions switched on
VisibilityFor every person and every record type, the records the API returns are exactly the expected ones. Extra is a leak; missing is broken access
Probe batteryAbout 30 routes per forbidden record: lists, single records, version 2 API, counts, report views, group-by, search, link checks, linked documents, joined columns, comments, change history, file attachments, activity log, print view, PDF, export
Forbidden writesThe AI account writing scores or grades or editing a report; a student forging another team's report or signing off its own; a mentor changing another mentor's score or setting a final grade; a customer editing the sealed specification; a student writing the customer's decision
Dashboard reportsThe dashboard's reports read the database directly, so they are refused to everyone except the coordinator and the course manager

Result at the final checkpoint: all 14 checkpoints passed in one rebuild from scratch. At the final checkpoint: 49 active people x 23 record types, 1,564 records, 9,088 probe requests and 17 forbidden writes, with no leak and every write refused.

Known and accepted: a person can see that hidden records linked to a team exist ("1 hidden"), but nothing about them.